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PREFACE
Gender Lines is a logical outgrowth of our 
Women’s Studies Program at La Salle. In the 
spring of 1973, three years after accepting women 
into the Day School, the first women’s studies 
course was taught. By 1981, a Women's Studies 
Concentration had been approved. Each year some 
eight to twelve different women’s studies courses 
make gender the center of inquiry for students, 
unveiling as poet Carolyn Kizer insists, "merely 
the private lives of one half of humanity." 
Historian Joan Kelly-Gadol describes how 
traditional categories of historical periods seem 
insufficient when women's lives and status are 
interjected! "Suddenly we see these ages with a 
new double vision— and each eye sees a new 
picture." For contemporary poet and critic 
Adrienne Rich, the new knowledge about gender is 
not simply an intellectual question, but a 
personal one:
Re-vision— the act of looking 
back, of seeing with fresh 
eyes, of entering an old text 
from a new critical
direction —  is for us more than 
a chapter in cultural history; 
it is an act of survival. 
Until we can understand the 
assumptions in which we are 
drenched we cannot know 
ourselves. . . We need to know
the writing of the past, and 
know it differently than we 
have ever known it; not to 
pass on a tradition but to 
break its hold over us.
As faculty teaching women’s studies courses, 
we have ourselves been instructed by our students 
who have been "seeing with fresh eyes." Aware of 
the excellence and originality of much of the
student writing tor our courses, the Women's 
Studies Steering Committee in the 1983-1984 
academic year, initiated an award tor the best 
student critical essay in women's studies. While 
the student might have written the paper tor any 
course, submissions were judged on the quality of 
their feminist analysis, the logic, style, and 
coherence of their writing, and the originality of 
conception. Diane Vari, an English major who 
graduated summa cum laude in 1984, won the first 
Women's Studies Essay Award tor her essay, "A 
Feminist Reading of Catherine Earnshaw."
In 1984-85 we increased the award from $25.00 
to $50.00 and committed ourselves to publishing a 
student journal in the fall of 1985. We expect to 
publish Gender Lines annually from now on. 
Twenty-seven student essays were submitted in 
1985, nearly triple the amount submitted our first 
year. As in the previous year, two faculty 
subcommittees were established, one in the Social 
Sciences and one in the Humanities. Student 
papers were submitted to the committees tor blind 
review. Each subcommittee made recommendations to 
the Women's Studies Steering Committee which, 
still judging papers without names attached, 
agreed on a winning essay.
Our 1985 Women's Studies Essay Prize was 
awarded last spring to Lorraine R. Sitler tor her 
paper, "The Treatment of Female Status Offenders 
by the Juvenile Justice System." Her essay 
appropriately opens our issue of Gender Lines.
Six other student essays were chosen tor 
publication. Together they remind us that we are 
just beginning to explore the edges of a genuinely 
co-educational curriculum, that is, one which 
includes data on and perspectives by and about 
women as well as men. We hope the essays also 
challenge us to explore the complex ways race, 
class, and gender intersect.
Like most human achievements, Gender Lines is 
the result of collective effort. Gender Lines 
could not have been produced without the 
commitment and talents of a number of people at La 
Salle. We are grateful first for the "double 
vision" represented by the twenty-seven essays 
submitted by La Salle students. Secondly, we were 
dependent on the dedication of the following 
faculty members for their generous expenditure of 
time in reviewing manuscripts, editing, proofing, 
publishing, and distributing Gender Lines; Patty 
Coleman, Arleen Dallery, Pat Harrington, Barbara 
C. Millard, Caryn McTighe Musi 1, Judith Newton, 
and Laura Otten. Finally, we would like to 
acknowledge our special debt to Mary Kane, a 
senior La Salle student who works in the Women's 
Studies Office, for her endurance in typing the 
manuscript into a computer that would rather have 
eaten the manuscripts than print them.
A Room of One's Own. Virginia Woolf's classic 
analysis of patriarchy's stifling effect on 
women’s creativity, grew out of a series of 
lectures she gave in 1928 to Newnham and Girton 
Colleges, the first women’s colleges in England 
which are now part of Cambridge University.
Women’s invisibility impeded Woolf’s research. 
Little had been documented, about either famous 
women or ordinary ones. In playful self- 
deprecation she suggests, "It would be ambitious 
beyond my daring, I thought, looking at the 
shelves for books that were not there, to suggest 
to the students of those famous colleges that they 
should re-write history, though I own that it 
often seems a little queer as it is, unreal, lop­
sided." Gender Lines, the product of students 
nearly a half century later, takes up Woolf’s 
challenge. Through their re-vision, our 
understanding of human beings is a little less 
queer, a little less lop-sided.
Caryn McTighe Musil for the 
Women’s Studies Steering Committee
1985 WOMEN’S STUDIES ESSAY AWARD WINNER
THE TREATMENT OF FEMALE STATUS OFFENDERS BY THE 
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Lorraine R. Sitler
Juvenile court judges seem to 
participate enthusiastically, 
though perhaps unconsciously 
in the judicial enforcement of 
the female role. Part of 
their behavior, while
discriminatory, is
understandable. Their legal 
background provides them with 
clear guidelines when
confronting youths charged 
with crimes. Standards of 
evidence are clear, elements 
of the crime are laid down by 
statute, and the youth’s civil 
rights are at least to some 
extent, protected by law. But 
in the case of a young woman 
charged with incorrigibi1ity 
or ungovernability, the court 
is without legal guidelines.
Many of these judges find 
themselves in a legal never- 
never land and, in this void, 
fall back on the role of 
benevolent but harsh parent, 
which is built into the 
juvenile justice system.1
This timely quotation from Meda Chesney-Lind 
defines the state of the female status offender in 
the juvenile court system today. As Gail 
Armstrong reiterates, "Most juvenile courts have 
broad discretionary powers vested in them by
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statutes...over a wide variety of juvenile 
activity."2 Armstrong further points out that 
while these statutes theoretically apply equally 
to males and females alike, they actually are 
applied "...in accordance with our double 
standards of juvenile morality and lend themselves 
to discriminatory enforcement against females."3 
Datesman and Scarpitti, in a seven month study of 
the juvenile court records of an eastern city, 
also find a double standard of morality present in 
the juvenile justice system. They find that male 
judges view female status offenders as sexual 
delinquents and thus impose a greater moral 
censure upon their activities. The juvenile court 
utilizes its discretionary power in, what the 
researchers term "...the service of traditional 
sex r o l e s . T h e i r  research illuminates the fact 
that the juvenile court judges are less concerned 
with the protection of the females than with the 
protection of the sexual status quo.®
Only in recent years has the entire 
disturbing issue of discriminatory treatment 
against female status offenders in every stage of 
the juvenile justice system been acknowledged in 
criminological research. Eileen Leonard, in her 
work on women and crime, outlines some of the 
major findings of the last decade or so: In 1970,
Terry and Cohn found that girls are more likely to 
be sentenced to institutions. Rogers’ study 
(1972) of juvenile institutions in Connecticut 
noted that 31 per cent of the girls and none of 
the boys were institutionalized for non-criminal 
offenses (such as being incorrigible) while only 
0.05 per cent of the boys were incarcerated for 
such offenses. The vast majority of female 
offenders (in the courts) were charged with status 
violations (Sarri 1976), which are not illegal for 
adults and which many states permit only females 
to be arrested for (Chesney-Lind 1973). In 
addition, juvenile courts give more severe 
dispositions to females even though males are more 
frequently involved in serious offenses. Finally
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gynecological examinations were ordered for 
burglary and larceny offenses, reflecting 
society's unrelenting concern with controlling 
the sexual activities of minor females as opposed 
to those of males (Chesney-Lind) . 
The wide-spread notion that female status 
delinquency means female sexual delinquency 
produces unbelievable disparities and abuses 
within the juvenile justice system. In the New 
York family court, all girls, even those held on 
non-sexual charges, are required to submit to 
vaginal smears. Similarly, here in Philadelphia, 
girls brought to the Youth Study Center regardless 
of age, are required to submit to an internal 
exam.7 When pressed on this issue, the Director 
of the Philadelphia Study Center admitted that 
those girls who refuse to submit to the exam and 
smear are placed in "medical lock-up," a polite 
term for solitary confinement.8 Such abuses of 
minor females, moreover, are not atypical of the 
nation-wide juvenile court response to status 
offenders. The faulty mentality of those who 
possess power in the juvenile system, namely 
police, probation officers, judges and policy 
makers, is largely to blame for these present 
injustices. As recently as 1975, Hunter Hurst, 
the director of the Juvenile Justice Division of 
the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges, 
issued the following unenlightened statement 
concerning female status offenders:
The issue is that status 
offenses are offenses against 
our values. Girls are 
seemingly over-represented as 
status offenders because we 
have a strong heritage of 
being protective toward 
females in this country. It 
offends our sensibility and 
our values to have a fourteen 
year old girl engage in
3
sexually promiscuous activity.
It's not the way we like to 
think about females in this 
country. As long as it 
offends our values, be sure 
that police, or the Church or 
vigilante groups, or somebody 
is going to do something about 
it. For me, I would rather 
that something occur in the 
court where the rights of the 
parties can be protected.9
The legal "protection" for females which Mr. 
Hurst assumes to exist in the courts come into 
question when the actual practices of the juvenile 
court are reviewed. Gail Armstrong, for example, 
finds that morality statutes, which exist in many 
states, enable the juvenile court to place any 
juvenile under custody for almost any act for a 
period ranging from six months to eleven years. 10 
She succinctly states that juvenile morals 
statutes are: "1) unconstitutionally broad because 
they encourage selective enforcement against 
female juveniles according to a double standard of 
sexual morality, 2) unconstitutionally vague, 3) 
impermissible in that they punish a status."
These sexually discriminatory statutes suggest 
that females need more supervision for a longer 
period so that they may be protected from 
themselves and their sexuality.12
These morality statutes which are pervasive 
but which have come under fire as of late, were 
studied in the late 1950's by an enlightened male 
who recognized the dangers of the sexually based 
standards of the juvenile court. Albert Reiss, in 
examining 1500 cases of alleged sexual misbehavior 
heard by a metropolitan juvenile court, observed 
how stereotypical views of women affected the 
outcomes in the cases. He found that the judge
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...refused to treat any form 
of sexual behavior on the part 
of boys, even the most bizarre 
forms, as warranting more than 
probationary status. The 
judge, however, regarded girls 
as the ’cause' of sexual 
deviation in boys in all cases 
of coition involving an 
adolescent couple and refused 
to hear the complaints of the 
girl and her family; the girl 
was regarded as a 
prostitute.13
The obsession which the juvenile court has 
with the sexual conduct, or in fact misconduct, of 
juvenile females involves not only behavior 
directly related to sexual issues (i.e. 
fornication and prostitution), but also the entire 
realm of juvenile female delinquency. The court 
has, both blatantly and subtly, revealed that it 
sees juvenile female sexuality as the underlying 
premise for all female delinquency. Kristine 
Rogers, in her 1972 study of a Connecticut 
training school, found that the court viewed 
females as sexually precocious and attempted to 
remedy their precocity through lengthy 
incarcerations (girls received an average of 7 
months in an institution while the average for 
boys was 5 months) as well as through training in 
the "womanly arts" (i.e. religion, sewing, 
cooking, and beauty culture).14 Yet the archaic 
policies of the Connecticut juvenile court have 
been candidly discussed by court officials. One 
judge defended his decisions thus: "Why, most of 
the girls I commit are for status offenses. I 
figure, if a girl is about to get pregnant, we'll 
keep her until she’s sixteen and then ADA (Aid to 
Dependent Children) will pick her up."15
Such injustices are not uncommon in the 
juvenile system. Most researchers agree that
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female status delinquency is viewed almost 
entirely as sexual delinquency and is more 
■frequently and severely punished than male 
criminal delinquency.16 In line with this harsh 
view, Yona Cohn, in her study of females in the 
juvenile court, found that girls who appeared 
before the court "usually had committed delinquent 
acts against their parents or against sexual 
taboos— acts which the probation officer generally 
considered as products of social background and 
personality makeup."17 Since these acts were, 
"beyond the range of effective probation 
treatment, sexual delinquents were never 
recommended to probation."18
Cohen and Kluegel’s findings, in a 1979 
study, reiterate both the notion that female 
delinquency is sexual delinquency and that 
punishment of these female status offenders is 
unreasonably harsh. The researchers found that 
juvenile courts severely punished female alcohol 
and drug offenders and virtually overlooked the 
same behavior in male offenders. The courts 
defended their discriminatory practices on the 
grounds that the use of alcohol and drugs might 
lead to sexual promiscuity, voluntary or 
involuntary, and thus pregnancy. The courts 
reasoned that they were protecting the girl "from 
the possible consequences" by referring her more 
often. Ultimately, their research showed that 
females were not doing more; they were just being 
referred more than males.20
The seriousness of such inequitable juvenile 
court outcomes is obvious and while opinions 
cannot be changed solely by legislation, perhaps a 
change in the archaic, discriminatory, widely 
discretionary juvenile laws would prove a 
beneficial first step toward a more solid 
resolution. Rosemary Sarri suggests thats "where 
the laws are enforced in a discriminatory manner 
in spite of their apparently neutral nature, the 
reason is often that the laws are vague or
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overbroad, so that the double standard of morality 
may be applied with impunity."21 She then offers 
some of the terms applied to juveniles in legal 
statutes as examples: "...immoral, in danger of
becoming immoral, and moral depravity."22 In much 
the same way as Armstrong and Chesney-Lind, Sarri 
finds that, "the use of such terms gives no 
standards for determining the type of behavior 
prescribed; neither the person accused nor the 
judge, has any standard on which to base or judge 
behavior. 2 3
In recent years, progressive steps have been 
taken to improve the juvenile delinquency laws.
Two federal court decisions, one in California and 
one in New York, have held that statutes which 
permitted officials to take custody of juveniles 
because they were "in danger of leading an idle, 
dissolute, lewd or immoral life" (Gonzalez vs.
Maillard 1972) or because they were "in danger of 
becoming morally depraved" (Geisicki vs. Oswald 
1971) were impermissibly vague.24 As I have 
suggested, a change in legal statutes could bring 
about a change in the mentality of court 
officials, at least as far as their professional 
opinions are concerned. Perhaps, however, a 
larger hurdle must be overcome if justice is to 
reign in the juvenile justice system.
Ironically, the ideologies which permeate the 
juvenile system ("in loco parentis" and "parens 
patriae") and which are expressed in the act of 
protecting the ’daughters' of the court, find 
their roots with another problematic group— the 
biological parents. The behavior of the juvenile 
court personnel, moreover, might be controlled by 
more equitable edicts, but the behavior and rights 
of the natural parent are subject to many fewer 
legalities. Hence, parents have nearly unlimited 
rights and powers concerning a juvenile.
It would seem too, that parents and the 
juvenile courts work in collusion against the 
female status offender. Armstrong makes the
7
•following observations Many females who step 
outside the expected sex roles are adjudicated 
because of parental pressure. Juvenile courts are 
highly concerned with obedience to parents 
especially on the part of a daughter. Thus, 
because parents have different expectations of 
sons and daughters, the juvenile court responds 
differently to male and female offenders.25 
Teilmann and Landry similarly conclude that
female status offenders 
probably are
disproportionately represented 
in police, probation, court 
and institutional populations. 
Furthermore, this 
representation is probably the 
result of different societal 
expectations of girls compared 
with boys, but the weight of 
this difference is likely to 
result from parents more than 
from the system since (in 
their study) disposition 
decisions were not obviously 
or consistently biased after 
we controlled for offense type 
and prior record.26
While the bulk of their findings are not 
consistent with previous research, they, too, 
recognize the major influence that parents have 
over the control of the juvenile in the juvenile 
justice system.
William Barton also finds that girls fare 
worse in the hands of the system basically because 
of the sex-role stereotypes that people cling to: 
"Boys will be boys and are expected to engage in a 
certain amount of mischief, some of which may be 
delinquent...but for girls, delinquent behavior is 
viewed as a more serious problem."28 The strict
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and rigorous patterns of behavior that society, in 
the person of the parents, requires from minor 
females tends to spill over into juvenile court 
affairs with inordinant frequency. Thus Chesney- 
Lind, in researching judicial paternalism, found 
that "referral rates are higher for verbal abuse 
than for assault; a refusal to obey and coming 
home late will get you before a judge more quickly 
than arson or illegal entry." 29
Cohen and Kleugal, in their comparison study 
of the Denver and Memphis juvenile courts, 
similarly found that a female is more likely to be 
detained for a decorum offense because she is more 
likely to be referred by her parents.30 
Furthermore, in a New York study, researchers 
found that, "to intake officers, parental 
objection to a daughter’s boyfriend (64 per cent 
of the referred cases) was more serious than a 
charge of larceny (57 per cent of the cases 
referred.)31 One final indignity that Conway and 
Bogdan elicited is that
in (1976) alone, 100,000 
juveniles were committed to 
rehabilitative agencies ...of 
this number, almost 60 per 
cent were detained solely on 
the suggestion of parents or 
school officials before having 
a formal hearing with a judge.
In most instances, the actual 
violation of a legal statute 
was unnecessary.32
Such biased behavior in detaining females 
carries over into the realm of incarceration. 
Chesney-Lind, for example, finds the reasoning 
that Kratcoski presents for detaining females 
without judicial referral seriously faulty.
Girls, according to Kratcoski, can be detained if 
they are picked up as runaways and if parents 
cannot be reached immediately. Kratcoski reasons
9
that if the girl cannot be returned to her own 
home and if she "...[-finds] the detention center 
environment more comfortable and less threatening 
than her own home," she should remain there.33 He 
concludes that "what may appear to be differential 
treatment of female offenders may in fact be the 
juvenile [system’s] response to girls’ special 
needs and its utilization of the limited 
alternatives available."34 In essence, Chesney- 
Lind finds that Kratcoski defends punitive 
incarceration on the basis of the females’ "need."
This protective rationale might seem 
plausible until additional data are considered. 
Chesney-Lind, for example, finds that, despite the 
fact that young women generally pose no threat to 
community well-being, they are comparatively 
underrepresented in non-incarceratory shelters and 
farms. Secondly, she finds that "the conditions 
in the nation’s detention facilities are by no 
means characterized by the protective atmosphere 
described by proponents of the practice of 
detaining young women."35 Females in the New York 
Family Court are not only detained for longer 
periods than are males but for the most part are 
housed in merely custodial institutions with no 
rehabilitative philosophy.36 Finally this notion 
that females need protection from themselves 
allows for discrepancies between the permissible 
length of confinement in "treatment" or 
"rehabilitative" institutions.37 Statistics, 
moreover, tend to support Chesney-Lind’s view of 
incarceration patterns. A report in the mid- 
1970’s by the Juvenile Justice Task Group noted 
that "...fully 70 per cent of females held by the 
courts could be labelled as status offenders as 
they had not been charged with committing either a 
misdemeanor or a felony."38 The National 
Assessment of Juvenile Corrections, working out of 
the University of Michigan, found that not only 
are females disproportionately committed for 
status offenses, but that in the institutionalized 
population, fully "50 per cent of the females were
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there for status offenses." It also found that 
"in all cases, females were committed 
disproportionately for offenses (i.e. status, 
drug) that had little if any relationship to 
protection of the community. Vet they were placed 
in institutions more frequently and held for 
longer periods."39 It stands to reason that most 
of these incarcerated female status offenders were 
detained and institutionalized for behavior which 
was not consistent with societal role expectations 
rather than for behavior which was legally defined 
as criminal.
A sub-category of juveniles who are also at 
the mercy of their parents and the courts and are 
treated as harshly as felons by both, are the 
Persons in Need of Supervision (PINS). Milton 
Rector, in his research on PINS, finds this a 
vicious cycle: "A 'considerable majority' of PINS 
petitions are filed by the children's mothers 
ostensibly because the youngsters are beyond 
control."40 However, Rector states, children 
often become status offenders by running away from 
home because of brutal or alcoholic parents: "One
of the major reasons for girls running away is to 
avoid sexual abuse from their fathers, their 
stepfathers or their mother’s boyfriends."41 
Conway and Bogdan also find that PINS can be 
remanded to a facility for an indeterminant period 
and that "...a girl who is promiscuous can be 
legally detained longer than a boy of comparable 
age who has committed a serious felony."42 The 
researchers attribute such a finding to this 
underlying issue —  the courts, like good parents, 
are detaining females for their own good. More 
notably, although one-half of all minors are given 
felony-length incarcerations each year for such 
activities as being ungovernable and, in the case 
of females, promiscuous, none of the regulations 
that apply to felons apply to the girl.43
The status offender, therefore, particularly 
the female status offender and the female PINS,
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are injured by a double-edged sword. Both parents 
and the courts, acting "as good parents," work 
together to punish, and severely punish, their 
daughters for, as Conway and Bogdan state 
"...doing little more than offending their 
community’s sense of propriety. "As Gail 
Armstrong put it,
Special sentencing statutes, 
sentencing judges, and 
society’s conception of the 
female sex role are all 
responsible for the unjust 
sentencing of females. The 
disparate sentences received 
by males and females found 
guilty of the same offenses 
provide the most blatant 
evidence of this unequal 
treatment. Special sentencing 
statutes enacted at the turn 
of the century to ’protect’ 
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LINDA: A WOMAN ENTRAPPED BY FANTASY
Stacy Michelle Kaplan
In examining Katherine Mansfield's two short 
stories entitled "Prelude," and "At The Bay," one 
sees that Linda becomes dependent upon her 
■fantasies in order to ensure her own psychological 
health. She wishes to reject motherhood, as well 
as other domestic qualities which were 
characteristic of the average woman and it is in 
her dreams that she expresses her sense of 
entrapment:
Suddenly he bent down and 
parted the grasses and showed 
her a tiny ball of fluff just 
at her feet.... She made a 
cup of her hands and caught 
the tiny bird and stroked its 
head with her finger. It was 
quite tame. But a funny thing 
happened. As she stroked it 
began to swell, it ruffled and 
pouched, it grew bigger and 
bigger and its round eyes 
seemed to smile knowingly at 
her. Now her arms were hardly 
wide enough to hold it and she 
dropped it into her apron. It 
had become a baby with a big 
naked head and a gaping bird- 
mouth, opening and shutting.
Her father broke into a loud 
clattering laugh and she woke 
to see Burnell standing by the 
windows...("Prelude," 65.)
Linda’s dream begins very innocently, as do 
her ideas about love, marriage, and sexuality.
She is ignorant of the confinement her sensuality 
can eventually have upon her, that confinement
being motherhood, and yet the literary terminology 
used within this passage is very suggestive of 
pregnancy and the period of growth it encompasses. 
The image of the "gaping bird-mouth" reflects the 
all-consuming demands she will encounter from her 
children, for Linda’s responsibility will be to 
nurture her newborn child, placing her own 
priorities last. As time passes, moreover, she 
will continue to lose more and more control over 
her own life and desires.
Perhaps, however, Linda never really had any 
control over her own life at all. Most women at 
that time did not, for they were shuffled from 
their family home to the home of their new 
husband. I emphasize the word "husband" since all 
property soon became his. Evidence of this lack 
of control, for example, may be found in both of 
these stories, in the effect Stanley’s presence 
has upon Linda’s actions, as well as upon those of 
other women. For example, on moving day Stanley’s 
slippers, considered an "urgent necessity," are 
deemed more important than their own childrens 
"We shall simply have to leave them [the 
children]. That is all. We shall simply have to 
cast them off," said Linda Burnell. A strange 
little laugh flew from her 1ips"("Prelude," 53). 
Overbearing male presence is again referred to in 
the following passages:
Linda did not rest again until 
the final slam of the front 
door told her that Stanley was 
really gone ("Prelude,"
67)...Oh, the relief, the 
difference it made to have the 
man out of the house. Their 
very voices were changed as 
they called to one another; 
they sounded warm and loving 
and as if they shared a 
secret("At The Bay," 106)...
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At these times, Linda can be herself. She doesn’t 
have to exaggerate her physical limitations in 
order to build up Stanley’s ego. The stylish 
image of frailty and sickness has left Linda pale 
and aggressively weak, but now the women could 
come together as comrades, without fear of 
infringement by their suppressors.
Linda’s fantasy about the bird also echoes a 
sense of betrayal by her father. She had believed 
her father to be the exception to all the other 
men. However, his "loud clattering laugh" proves 
him to be a fellow conspirator with the rest of 
the male gender. Linda also finds the selection 
of her husband an affirmation of her father’s 
control over her: "...Linda’s father pulled her
ear teasingly, in the way he had. ’Linney’s 
beau,’ he whispered. ’Oh papa, fancy being 
married to Stanley Burnell!’" ("At The Bay,"
115). On a macrocosmic level of interpretation, 
Linda’s bird fantasy suggests that reproduction 
means the perpetuation of women's subordination, 
and in particular, that it is male children who 
eventually suppress their own mothers. Men rule 
women’s lives. Linda’s husband even watches her 
while she sleeps, guarding her as if to prevent 
any possible threat to his male supremacy.
Linda experiences a few isolated moments of 
superiority, and at these times, she is linked 
with nature to emphasise women’s oneness with it. 
Women draw their strength from nature’s roots.
"The manuka tree, bent by the southernly winds, 
was like a bird on one leg stretching out a wing" 
("At The Bay," 134). Here the bird image 
symbolizes Linda’s attempt to escape the pressure 
of male influences. It appears that under the 
manuka tree this is possible, for we visualize 
Linda stronger and more independent within this 
setting. For instance, Linda appears to be the 
successful party in her meeting with Jonathan. It 
is his life that seems haphazard in direction,
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whereas Linda's life looks at least 
materialistical1y desirable.
Linda experiences another moment of power in 
the scene with her son under the manuka tree. As 
an infant her son is dependent upon his mother for 
nurturance, and Linda’s rejection of her son 
enables her to display a sense of power over him: 
"I don’t like babies" ("At The Bay," 116).
However, her supposedly absent maternal instinct 
also surfaced: "...it was something far 
different, it was something so new, ....The tears 
danced in her eyes; ...but by now the boy had 
forgotten his mother. He was serious again...He 
made a tremendous effort and rolled right over" 
("At The Bay," 117). Once Linda begins to 
understand the potential joys of motherhood, she 
is rejected by her son. The child’s ability to 
roll over is far more important to him than 
dealing with the petty inconveniences of his 
mother. It is as if she were no longer important. 
Symbolically, this implies that males really do 
not see women as necessary to such important 
issues as their growth and increasing control over 
their environment. Women need only menial tasks 
to keep them happy; or so men believe.
Linda’s next fantasy also focuses on the 
theme of escape:
Her clothes lay across a 
chair— her outdoor things, a 
purple cape and a round hat 
with a plume in it. Looking 
at them she wished that she 
was going away from this 
house, too. And she saw
herself driving away from them 
all in a little buggy, driving 
away from everybody and not 
even waving.... He pitched the 
wet towel on top of her hat 
and cape ("Prelude," 66.)
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Experience has shown her the course her life will 
take in time and Linda desires to throw it away 
•for a life void of men and children. Stanley, 
however, demonstrates his belief that Linda’s 
ideas are trivial by throwing a wet towel on top 
of her outdoor clothing. He has no respect for 
her belongings or her fantasies, and once again 
his dominant position in her life is represented. 
The fact that it is her outdoor clothing that gets 
ruined symbolizes Stanley’s desire for Linda to 
remain bound to domestic life. He will dampen her 
hopes for escape. Indeed, he is the obstacle that 
keeps her desires mere fantasy:
...that was her real grudge 
against life; that was what 
she could not understand.
That was the question she 
asked and asked and listened 
in vain for the answer. It 
was all very well to say it 
was the common lot of women to 
bear children. It wasn’t
true. She, for one, could 
prove that wrong. She was 
broken, made weak, her courage 
was gone, through
chil dbearing. And what made 
it doubly hard was she did not 
love her children. It was 
useless pretending...("At The 
Bay,” 116.)
Stanley, although a loving husband, appears 
insensitive and ignorant to Linda’s needs as a 
woman, and this passage displays the biting and 
radical feelings some women hold with respect to 
motherhood. Opinions such as these, however, even 
though silent, are very threatening to the status 
quo. Thus, both Linda and Stanley continue living 
within separate worlds, only to come together 
during sex.
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Linda's attempt to be heard by Stanley is 
symbolized by the reference to his ears in the 
following passage: "...'What have you got in your 
button-hole - cherries?' She took them out and 
hung them over his ears...so she took them off his 
ear again. 'You don't mind if I save them.
They'd spoil my appetite for dinner'"
("Prelude, "p. 78) Linda hangs both cherries on his 
ear because she needs to discuss the lack of 
equality within their relationship. Unsuccessful, 
she later removes the cherries. This passage also 
has sexual implications, for it seems as if Linda 
attempts to reclaim her virginity by holding onto 
the cherries. If she eats them, her appetite will 
be spoiled, just as her marriage became less 
appealing when her virginity was lost and she 
became only the object of Stanley's desire. As 
Linda continues to put Stanley off, she is 
identified with the cold, pale, virginal moon.
Another fantasy of Linda’s reminds one of the 
narrator’s experience in "Yellow Wallpaper" by 
Charlotte Gilman. Both women alone in their rooms 
discover an added dimension within the wallpaper 
surrounding them:
She turned over to the wall 
and idly, with one finger, she 
traced a poppy on the 
wallpaper with a leaf and a 
stem and a fat bursting bud 
the poppy seemed to come 
alive...the strangest part of 
this coming alive of things 
was what they did. They 
listened, they seemed to swell 
out with some mysterious 
important content, and when 
they were full she felt that 
they smiled. But it was not 
for her, only, their sly 
secret smile; they were
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members of a secret society 
and they smiled among 
themselves...("Prelude," 68-
9).
The wallpaper comes alive with this poppy image, 
but this reference to nature, appears to employ 
all male imagery. The poppy seed as a bud is a 
phallic symbol. Although Linda touches it, and it 
becomes swollen and full, she is just as removed 
from this experience as she is from her sexuality 
with Stanley. The buds share a secret that Linda 
is excluded from. The origin of their secret is 
not clear, however. It might refer to children or 
perhaps the existing conspiracy between the men of 
this story.
The "Yellow Wallpaper" also reflects a series 
of women trapped within the walls of their gender 
revealing a female bond among the women as well as 
a characteristic isolation. Maybe like the 
narrator of the "Yellow Wallpaper" Linda is on the 
verge of a mental breakdown. Immersed deeply 
within the realm of fantasy, Linda will free 
herself from the stereotypical role of wife and 
mother, but isn't the cost of sanity a high price 
to pay? Mansfield does not allow the reader to 
come to any conclusive answers. Her sporadic, 
fragmented scenes only give the reader clues as to 
the real meaning which lies within them.
Mansfield's stories also share a common 
denominator with Virginia Woolf's A Room of One's 
Own. Both works stress at one point the 
importance to a woman of possessing her own room 
in order to achieve success: "And everything, even 
the bedpost, knows you, responds, shares your 
secret.... You're not very fond of your room by 
day. You never think about it...it's suddenly 
dear to you.... It's yours. Oh, what a joy it is 
to own things. Mine - my own!" ("At The Bay," 
133). Linda's opportunity to find her true self 
comes when she acquires this room. Although the
room isn't completely hers, the time she has in it 
alone is precious. The room may symbolize Linda's 
■finding a sense of worth. However, it is evident 
that she occupies her dominion only when she can 
sneak a few moments away from Stanley. For 
instance, Linda finds the late, late night hours 
to be "...as though you were slowly, almost with 
every breath, waking up into a new wonderful, far 
more thrilling and exciting world than the 
daylight one" ("At The Bay," 133). A room of 
one's own is also a popular image of the freedom 
and power of a woman alone. But society looks at 
an individual's worth in terms of their material 
accomplishments. Since Stanley owns the entire 
house, and Linda doesn't even own one whole room, 
she is once again forced to assume a subservient 
role to Stanley.
Nature imagery plays an important role in 
Mansfield stories. There is a very close identity 
between females and nature, the earth and its 
products. Man destroys nature by pollution, and 
man destroys woman by waste.
...she looked up at the dark, 
close, dry leaves of the 
manuka.... Each pale yellow 
petal shone as if each was the 
careful work of a loving hand.
The tiny tongue in the center 
gave it the shape of a bell.
And when you turned it over 
the outside was a deep bronze 
colour. But as soon as they 
flowered, they fell and were 
scattered.... Who takes the 
trouble-or they joy-to make 
all these things that are 
wasted...It was uncanny....
If only one had time to look 
at these flowers long enough, 
time to get over the sense of 
novelty and strangeness, time
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to know them! But as soon as 
one paused to part the petals, 
to discover the underside of 
the leaf, along came Life and 
one was swept away. And, 
lying in her cane chair, Linda 
felt so light; she felt like a 
leaf. Along came Life like a 
wind and she was seized and 
shaken; she had to go. Oh 
dear, would it always be so?
Was there no escape" ("At The 
Bay," 114-5)?
Here Linda visualizes herself as flowers, but 
she is deflowered through Stanley's sexuality. It 
is he who seizes her "like the wind," thereby 
disallowing her escape from the seemingly 
inevitable cycle— promise, exploitation, 
consummation, and ultimate destruction. Linda 
realized that because men view women as "novelty 
or strangeness" they keep them suppressed, for men 
fear what they do not understand. It is for this 
reason they consider females inferior. This was 
"Life." Life wasted women. Life is wasting 
Linda. She longs for freedom, freedom to be a 
woman independent of her sex. She wants equality 
in the world of male supremacy.
The aloe, finally, seems to be Linda's way of 
defining herself. "I like that aloe: I like it
more than anything here. I am sure I shall 
remember it long after I’ve forgotten all the 
other things" ("Prelude," 93). Linda’s sense of 
womanhood is characterized by this plant, for she 
must maintain a secretive sense of self worth in 
order to protect herself from society. She had 
been "split and broken;...withered" from her 
experiences of childbirth ("Prelude," 74). Now, 
her only protection lies in the "long, sharp 
thorns" to ward off submission to her 
"Newfoundland dog Stanley" ("Prelude," 93,92). 
Beneath her curling leaves she hides the true
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thoughts, hopes, and desires of an imprisoned 
woman awaiting her escape ("Prelude," 75). 
Although she appears submissive and beaten, she 
waits dormantly for her flower to bloom.
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VIOLENT PORNOGRAPHY AGAINST WOMEN: 
RESPONSIBILITIES AND CHOICES OF THE FILMMAKER
Anita M. Mastroieni
Violent pornography is a growing concern of 
many feminist and community groups. The effect 
that violent pornography has on society is still 
being debated, but many of these groups contend 
that its effects are detrimental. Unfortunately, 
there are no national guidelines as to the content 
of violent pornography, and ultimately, content is 
decided upon by the producers of violent 
pornograpy themselves. How they choose this 
content could very well affect the future of the 
entire industry.
"Pornography has come to occupy its own niche 
in the communications and entertainment media," 
writes Helen Longino.1 Indeed, pornography 
appears in all types of media: literature, 
periodicals, television’s cable channels, and 
film. But film has been singled out as the 
vehicle for pornography to be studied in this 
paper. There are two reasons for this selection. 
First, there is the impact, past and present, that 
film potentially has on mass audiences. Annette 
Kuhn suggests that "The close-up fast-cutting, the 
sophistication of modern make-up and special 
effects techniques, the heightening effect of 
sound effects and music all combine on the large 
screen to produce an impact which no other medium 
can create."2
Secondly, pornographic film is more socially 
visible than other media. In order to purchase 
hard-core books or magazines, one must enter a 
special shop or section of a shop. One must 
subscribe to pornographic cable channels to 
receive them. But one need only walk down New 
York's 42nd Street or Philadelphia's Market Street 
to be subjected to graphic advertisements and
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suggestive titles of currently-playing movies. 
After all, there are an estimated 900 x-rated 
movie theaters in the United States today.3 Even
A Brief History of Violent Pornography
Erotic and pornographic films have been with 
us since cinema was first developed. As early as 
the thirties, feature-length films were devoted to 
the depiction of the naked body, male and female. 
But it wasn't until the mid-sixties that violent 
pornography took to the screen. Russ Meyers is 
credited with releasing the first nationally 
distributed feature-length "Roughie," as violent 
pornography used to be called. His movie, Lorna, 
"created a vogue for Gothic dramas in which sex 
took second place to violence."8 In their book,
Sinema, Turan and Zito discuss the sex-and- 
violence films that became popular with 
exploitation filmmakers during the sixties:




flagellation, bondage and 
leather orgies...The icons of 
this genre are boots, chains, 
ropes, knives, hatchets, and 
all lethal instruments, both
sharp and blunt, and the
characters are motivated by 
lust and avarice...Blood 
rather than semen becomes the 
symbolic fluid of erotic 
expression.9
Turan and Zito go on to explain that these films, 
"featuring neither complete nudity nor loving 
sexual contact, were largely exempt from the wrath 
of the censors."10
Pornographic film audiences having quickly 
become tired of conventional sex and sexual 
fantasies on the screen, sent producers searching 
for new taboos to depict on film. Violent 
pornography was a logical outcome. Today, some
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believe that audiences have become bored with the 
S-M rituals of violent pornography. In 1980, for 
example, Screw magazine conducted an "informal" 
survey among audiences of pornographic films to 
find out what they preferred to see in their 
pornography.11 According to the survey, violence 
and rape were low on the list of preferences, and 
anal intercourse was highest. Joseph W. Slade, in 
his essay, "Recent Trends in Pornographic Films," 
concluded that audiences are no longer interested 
in violence. He later listed some reasons why 
anal intercourse might be preferred: "There is 
pain (real or feigned) expressed on the faces of 
women participants...and anal intercourse often 
sublimates male homosexuality and hostility toward 
females. "14 It seems fairly obvious, however, 
that audiences today are not at all bored with 
violence, but that they are tired of the usual 
violent fare, and are looking for violence 
manifested in different ways. There is still a 
sizeable amount of degradation in a depiction of a 
woman uncomfortably or painfully submitting to a 
sexual encounter.
Historically, legislation concerning 
pornography has either been thoroughly stringent 
or vague and ambiguous. Much of today’s 
legislation on pornography is based on the 
findings of the President’s Commission on 
Obscenity and Pornography, which published its 
results in 1970. The Commission made no 
distinctions between violent pornography and non­
violent pornography, but instead defined 
"pornography" as "the degrading and demeaning 
portrayal of the role and status of the human 
female...as a mere sexual object to be exploited 
and manipulated sexually."13 Despite the highly 
unflattering picture of pornography's effect on 
society that this definition paints, the final 
conclusion of the Commission was that there was no 
relationship between exposure to pornography and 
subsequent antisocial behavior.1*̂
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In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down 
the Miller decision, which, in effect, permitted 
states and cities to establish their own 
"community standards" regarding the definition of 
obscenity. The Court developed a three-part test 
for obscenity: 1) whether an average person, 
applying "contemporary community standards" would 
find the work in question prurient: 2) whether the 
work is a "patently offensive" depiction of sexual 
conduct specifically proscribed by state law; and 
3) whether the work, taken as a whole, "lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value."15 The basic result of this 
decision is that smaller cities and towns have 
some control over the pornography market in their 
commmunity, while in the larger cities, 
pornography thrives on designated "strips." In 
May of 1984, President Reagan announced that 
Attorney General William French Smith would soon 
set up a new national commission to study the 
effects of pornography on society.16 Unknown as 
of now are who will be on the commission, how it 
will be conducted, and when the results will be 
publis hed.
Research on the Effects of Pornography
Despite the claims of the 1970 President’s 
Commmission on Obscenity and Pornography, some 
researchers are still looking into the effects 
that pornography has on its viewers and society in 
general. The results are divided; some will say 
there are no antisocial or otherwise adverse 
effects from violent pornographic films, and some 
will say there are. One can say that most of the 
conclusions spring from the researcher’s own 
presuppositions, and not necessarily from the 
data. Or, one can say that the data can be 
interpreted in different ways, and that the 
researcher interprets according to his/her own 
hypothesi s.
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Robert Stoller writes, for example, that "No 
depiction is pornographic until an observer’s 
fantasies are added; nothing is pornographic per 
se."17 Depending on the individual’s fantasies, 
the effect may be harmful, healthy, or neither. 
"Typically, annoyed individuals shown an arousing 
film are more aggressive than those shown a non­
arousing film," conclude Mueller and Donnerstein 
in their experiments.18 If an individual is 
predisposed to misogyny, perhaps only he will 
respond to violent pornography overtly, while 
others would not. Later research, however, does 
claim to show that exposure to "sexually violent 
pornography" may lead to "antisocial behaviors" in 
most viewers. These behaviors include an increase 
in: "an acceptance of rape myths, a willingness of 
a man to say he would commit a rape, and 
aggressive behavior toward women in a laboratory 
setting; and a decrease in one’s sensitivity to 
rape and rape victims...(and) in conclusion, there 
is a loss of sensitivity to real violence after 
repeated exposure to films with sex and 
violence."19 Still many recent researchers claim 
that violent pornography has no adverse effects, 
or unprovable adverse effects on the veiwer’s 
attitudes and behaviors. Obviously, there are no 
clear answers.
Feminist Arguments Against Pornography
Despite these contradictory findings many 
feminists condemn pornography as harmful to women. 
In her essay entitled "Pornography, Oppression and 
Freedom: A Closer Look," for example, Helen 
Longino lists three ways that pornography is 
injurious to women.2° The first, she writes, is 
that "violent pornography is implicated in the 
committing of crimes of violence against women." 
Secondly, pornography is the "vehicle for the 
dissemination of a deep and vicious lie about 
women." Sociologist Diana E. H. Russell, for 
example, writes that pornography "ideologically
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establishes that a woman's innermost wish is to 
subject herself to men. "21
Finally, Longino claims that pornography is 
injurious to women in that "it supports sexist 
attitudes and reinforces the oppression and 
exploitation of women. "22 Susan Brownmiller, for 
example, writes that, "There can be no ’equality' 
in porn, no female equivalent... Pornography, like 
rape, is a male invention"23 and Longino explains 
that "even men who do not frequent pornographic 
shops and movies are supported in the sexist 
objectivication of women by their environment. "24
Indeed, many, although not all, feminists 
view pornography as anti-female propaganda.
Beverly LaBelle, for example, in her essay, "The 
Propanganda of Misogyny," cites eight techniques 
universally employed in propaganda campaigns (as 
outlined by J.A.C. Brown in Techniques of 
Persuasion.)25 She then explains how each 
technique is employed in violent pornography.
These eight techniques are; 1) Use of stereotypes 
(women are virgins or carnal women); 2) Name 
substitution (women are routinely referred to as 
"tramp," "bitch," "cunt," etc., but rarely as 
human beings); 3) Selection (only one side of 
women's sexuality is depicted, contrary to the 
findings of The Hite Report which claims that 
women's sexuality is multi-faceted); 4) Lying 
(pornography lies about women’s sexuality, i.e. 
pain equals pleasure, etc.); 5) Repetition (the 
idea that women wish to be subject to men appears 
in most forms of violent pornography); 6)
Assertion (pornography is present everywhere in 
society; therefore its themes and ideas can be 
proclaimed everywhere); 7) Pinpointing the enemy 
(women are the enemy, they are the group to be 
subdued); and 8) Appeal to authority (testimonies 
from experts that pornography is not harmful give 
pornography a sense of respectability).26
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There are those, of course, who see feminist 
arguments against pornography as wrong. They 
believe violent pornography does not degrade women 
as a chief function. Turan and Zito, for example, 
write that "the more explicit the pornography, the 
less competent and powerful the man appears.
Women can much more easily simulate sexual arousal 
 and capability...The fantasy may be male
chauvanist, but the performance clearly 
establishes the female superiority."27 Joseph W. 
Slade also claims that "clearly many porn features 
degrade women. Equally clearly, many do not, 
simply because the female must at least sometimes 
be the male's equal or his superior...
Obviously, there is some debate on the amount of 
actual violence against women and the portrayal of 
women as inferior. But, one might ask, if men are 
given "equal time," as it were, is pornography no 
longer harmful to women? According to Susan 
Brownmiller, the consistent combination of 
violence and sex, or domination and sex on film 
can be harmful, no matter who the perpetrator is. 
"The glorification of forced sex under slavery, 
institutional rape...is doing irreparable damage 
to healthy sexuality.
Are There Any Redeeming Qualities to Violent 
Pornography?
There are also those who look for and find 
redeeming qualities in violent pornography. A 
common school of thought, expressed by Goldstein 
 and Kant in Pornography and Sexual Deviancy, is
that "trends of thought that one generation may 
consider seditious, obscene, and/or heretical are 
 often recognized as the 'great lights of
civilization' by the next."30 In this respect, 
pornography is seen as avant-garde and socially 
instructional, ahead of its time. But isn't it 
possible that pornography will finally reach a 
point when it becomes so obscene and seditious, 
that no generation will ever embrace it? How far 
does pornography have to go before it is
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universally rejected by all "following generations?
Nearly ten years ago a film entitled "Snuff" was 
released, a highly publicized movie which 
purported to show actual murder and dismemberment 
of a woman.31 Will this movie be one of the 
"great lights of civilization" of the next 
generation? It appears that some forms of violent 
pornography will not be embraced by the next
generation as anything except a sick artifact of 
times before.
Another argument for pornography is presented 
by Robert Stoller: "Pornography is for 
restitution; its creation and its use are 
ritualized acts, and deviation from a narrow, 
prescribed path will produce decreased sexual 
excitement."32 This has been the argument in 
favor of pornography since its beginning, but 
there is no way to prove or disprove it, since 
many outside factors contribute to sexual 
excitement as well. Finally, Joseph W. Slade 
provides one more argument in favor of 
pornography: "Despite its erosion in society at
large and in the 'legitimate' film, the taboo 
against graphic abuse of females is holding (in 
pornographic film)."33 It seems impossible, 
however, that this is true. One trip down 42nd 
Street, reading poster-boards for movies promising 
"all," movies with titles like "Blood Feast,"
"Snuff," and "Faster, Pussycat, Kill, Kill!," 
should suggest that the graphic abuse of women 
(and children and men) is thriving in today's 
pornography market.
i
Does the First Amendment Apply to Pornography?
Despite all the research that claims violent 
pornography can be harmful, however, it is 
protected under the First Amendment. Freedom of 
speech in this country is one of the most sacred 
of all rights, and it is not easy to prove who or 
what does not deserve the right to that freedom.
However, some groups have developed substantial
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arguments against violent pornography's protection 
under the First Amendment. Many feminists, -for 
example, agree that pornography is an abuse of the 
right to freedom of speech. Several types of 
speech are not protected by the First Amendment. 
Solicitation of crimes, perjury, slander, libel, 
and false advertising are a few examples, and many 
feminists contend that pornography should not be 
protected by the First Amendment, either.
According to Helen Longino "the manufacture and 
distribution of material which defames and 
threatens all members of a class by its 
recommendation of abusive and degrading behavior 
toward some members of that cl ass...seems a clear 
candidate for inclusion on the list" of speeches 
not protected by the First Amendment.34
Diana E.H. Russell admits that "banning 
pornography would probably just create a black 
market, but it is better to have it underground 
than to see it as an accepted part of our 
culture."35 As noted previously, the acceptance 
of pornography by the public media implies a 
cultural endorsement of its message. To have 
violent pornography exist solely on the black 
market is to imply that society does not endorse 
nor encourage the degradation and violence of 
women. Some feminist writers, however, believe 
that pornography's protection under the First 
Amendment is a necessity in order to preserve all 
freedoms and combat repression. Thus Jean Bethke 
Elshtain writes that "consistent overstatement of 
the problem and underplaying of the repressive 
potential in suggested solutions characterize much 
of the literature of the anti-pornography 
crusade. "36
Filmmakers; Their Responsibilities and Their 
Choices
No matter what one believes the outcome 
should be, for the present pornography is
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protected by the First Amendment and violent 
pornography is thriving in metropolitan areas.
As long as this is true it is the filmmakers 
who have the chief say in what goes in and what 
stays out of pornographic films. This power, 
moreover, should not be underestimated. "In 
realizing communal sexual fantasies— views of 
sex— pornographic films have, in turn, helped to 
shape and change those views. In terms of sheer 
numbers they cannot help but have some effect," 
write Turan and Zito.'37, If this is true, if 
violent pornography is indeed shaping the sexual 
views of society, then some of our sexual views at 
least are being constructed by the motivations and 
attitudes of a few filmmakers.
Money, of course, is the main motivtion of 
the pornographic filmmaker. "Liberal pieties have 
little to do with the real business of the porn 
film...," contends Joseph W. Slade.38 The real 
business of violent pornography has to do with 
money, with pleasing the male heterosexuals who 
make up 90% of the market.39 Certainly, 
filmmakers would not be producing violent 
pornography if there were not a market for it. 
However, the fact that audiences desire violent 
pornography should not excuse filmmakers from 
taking responsibility for what they contribute to 
society in the form of films. Helen Longino, 
moreover, suggests that reform of pornography 
films is possible. Film, which provides a 
temporal context for its actions, is easily able 
to upgrade socially unredeemable violent 
pornography: "In showing the before and after, a
filmmaker has plenty of opportunity to acknowledge 
the dignity of the person violated or clearly 
refuse to do so. "40 The filmmaker who depicts a 
woman who is raped, transformed into an insatiable 
nymphomaniac, and then is eternally grateful to 
her rapist, has not acknowledged that woman’s 
dignity, but the filmmaker who depicts a woman who 
is raped, and is violated and hurt by that action,
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and who must recover and bring that rapist to 
trial, has made an attempt to acknowledge that 
dignity.
The first woman, of course, is a stereotype 
and the second woman is "real," but it is time 
that filmmakers of violent pornography begin to 
use "real" characters in their films. Indeed, the 
use of real characters would appease many of the 
groups that are currently critical of violent 
pornographic films. Real characters have dignity. 
Real characters evoke sympathy when hurt. Real 
characters evoke dislike when they 
violate/degrade/abuse other characters.
Stereotypes cannot do the same. And yet real 
characters in real situations can be just as 
erotic, stimulating, and even as "kinky" as 
stereotypes in stereotypical situations. The 
difference is that no lies are being perpetrated. 
Shere Hite’s national study indicates that the 
majority of actual women do not wish to be subject 
to actual men.41 But if, from boyhood, a male is 
exposed to violent pornography, what else can he 
beli eve?
Producers of pornographic films, moreover, 
should be able to make stimulating films with real 
characters and make money as well. Filmmakers, of 
course, will argue that there is a market for 
violence and degradation. But if they produced 
violent and degrading films using real characters, 
that type of film would prove very shocking and 
brutal to the majority of the audience. Then in 
all probability, the market for violence would 
soon diminish. According to Joseph W. Slade 
"...without the cut-out characters and the erotic 
templates, film pornography would probably be 
intolerable to those who enjoy it most."42 But 
without the cut-out stereotypes, filmmakers would 
be able to produce what pornography was originally 
supposed to bet stimulating and arousing 
depictions of various sexual encounters between 
real people.
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Filmmakers, moreover, do not have to lose 
their audience by producing this kind of film. On 
the contrary, they might even increase their 
audiences. As states previously, men make up 
close to 100’/. of the pornographic film audience. 
But pornography using real characters, pornography 
in which neither party is robbed of dignity, would 
be more likely to attract women as well, because 
it would be less male-oriented. Indeed, 
pornography without a specific gender orientation 
might prove to be more profitable to 
pornographers, as it would begin to attract an 
entire segment of the popultion that has thus far 
been ignored.
How likely is it, however, that a widespread 
reform such as the one proposed could take place 
within the pornograhic film industry? In all 
probability, it is not very likely. Even if the 
use of "real" characters could make money, most 
filmmakers probably would not want to change 
tactics, nor see the need to change them. There 
must be some other kind of "incentive" for the 
filmmaker of violent pornography, and this 
"incentive" exists in the form of that sector of 
the feminist movement, which is against 
pornography. This sector, intact, has one of the 
most organized campaigns against pornography 
today. By publishing literature, staging 
protests, filing civil rights suits, and becoming 
involved in politics, this sector is growing in 
numbers and is creating quite a bit of publicity. 
And they are being strengthened by religious and 
community groups whose anti-pornography campaigns 
strive for the same goal— to end social acceptance 
of violent pornography. Of course, acceptance of 
violent pornography is stronger today than any 
anti-pornography movement, but slowly, this may 
change. The anti-pornography movement is not 
going away; and most groups are determined to work 
until their goal is reached.
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It seems, therefore, that the filmmakers of 
violent pornography have a choice. They can begin 
an industry-wide reform of their films, or they 
can continue as they have been and combat the 
anti-pornography movement. There is, however, a 
third potential outcome. More and more feminists 
are getting involved in politics, and their 
arguments against the protection of pornography 
under the First Amendment are quite substantial. 
The new President's Commission on Pornography may 
publish results which contradict those of a decade 
and a half ago and it is possible that violent 
pornography may one day fall from the complete 
protection that it currently enjoys under the 
First Amendment. Certainly, this kind of radical 
change would take years to come about, but it is 
possible.
Although it is unlikely that pornography will 
ever be entirely banned in this country, feminists 
against pornography could certainly bring about 
more stringent guidelines for its production and 
distribution. Donnerstein and Linz suggest in 
their study of 1984, that warnings (much like the 
Surgeon General's on cigerette packages) could 
accompany pornographic films as to the possible 
detrimental social effects of repeated viewings.43 
Regulations concerning the size and number of 
films playing on pornographic "strips" in major 
cities could be instituted. Indeed any number of 
steps could be taken to lower the status of 
violent pornography.
Of course, any type of government regulation 
is the nightmare of pornographic filmmakers. But 
they are bringing it upon themselves. Filmmakers 
should recognize that they must please not only 
the pornographic film audience, but the general 
public as well. If not, the growing number of 
those displeased with violent pornography will 
call upon the government to rectify the situation. 
Since pornographic filmmakers are the ones who 
will suffer most from government interference they
43
have to make a choice: reform or regulation. The 
response could mean a growing number of acceptable 
sexually explicit films or an end to the industry.
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"SILENCING AND SINGING IN SHERWOOD ANDERSON AND
TILLIE OLSEN"
Nancy J. Molyneaux
Tillie Olsen's "Tell Me a Riddle" and 
Sherwood Anderson's "Death In The Woods" are 
stories about the lives and deaths of two women. 
Both Eva, in "Tell Me a Riddle," and Mrs. Grimes, 
in Anderson's work, exist in silent solitude, and 
their stories are examples of how the structure of 
society shapes the lives of working-cl ass women. 
The differences between the two women, however, 
are more important in determining the meaning and 
significance of their lives. For Eva, solitude 
becomes a source of rebirth and rediscovery of the 
voice of her revolutionary past, a past that 
becomes a living legacy to her husband and 
granddaughter. Mrs. Grimes' past contains no 
springs of rebirth. She has so internalized her 
imaginative death that it is only through her 
physical death that she is able to draw from her 
community the attention and tenderness denied to 
her in life.
Society provided neither woman with a place 
or the time to establish herself as part of a 
community. Eva's time has been taken up by caring 
for her large family, and Mrs. Grimes is 
constantly burdened with the chore of feeding her 
husband, son, and the few scrawny animals they 
keep on their farm. Recent research in women's 
history has shown that as "women's public role was 
transmuted into private service there was a 
subsequent loss of public esteem."1 This appears 
to be true in the cases of Mrs. Grimes and Eva as 
well. Society, with its rigid expectations of 
women, binds them to certain duties and places and 
then ignores them. Mrs. Grimes, for example, can 
be "legally bound into some home"2 and treated 
like a slave, first as an orphaned child and later 
as a married woman. When she grows older and
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journeys on foot from her home to town for 
supplies, "people drive right down a road and 
never notice an old woman like that" (p. 39). 
Unlike Mrs. Grimes, however, Eva resists society's 
denial of her importance. When her husband 
threatens to sell their house she screams at him, 
"I am no shadow. You cannot sell without me."3 
Eva fights back against the restrictions placed 
upon her, but she cannot escape them entirely.
The demands of their -families have confined 
the growth of both women. Eva claims,
when the need was done—  oh 
the power that was lost in the 
painful damming back of what 
still surged but had nowhere 
to go (p. 428).
As for Mrs. Grimes, "every moment of every 
day, as a young girl... was spent feeding 
something. Then she married Jake Grimes and he 
had to be fed" (p. 41). Their tasks are made even 
more difficult by their poverty. Mrs. Grimes' 
husband often "left everything for her to manage 
and she had no money" (p. 42). Similarly, Eva 
reminds her husband that "for every penny I had to 
ask—  and sometimes... there was nothing. But 
always I_ had to manage" (p. 419).
The struggles of both women to "manage" are 
enveloped in silence. It is no wonder that Eva 
has become silent since her daughter recalls 
things like "the time you came to school and I 
almost died of shame because of your accent"
(p. 431). Mrs. Grimes uses silence to protect 
herself from the abuse of her husband and son: 
"Whatever happened she never said anything. That 
was her way of getting along. She had managed
The love—  the passion
tending—  had risen with 





that way when she was a young girl...and ever 
since she had married Jake" (p. 44).
The most important difference between the two 
women, however, lies in the fact that Eva has not 






there was more, 
springs were in her 
Somewhere an older 
beat for life (p.
In her solitude Eva finds "a reconciled peace"
(p. 420) while Mrs. Grimes meets only death. Eva 
has both the desire and the means for growth. She 
has it in her power to awaken in David, her 
husband, the memory of their past dedication to 
liberation and to pass that memory on to her 
granddaughter, Jeannie. The source of Eva's 
strength lies in the fact that she, unlike Mrs. 
Grimes, is not a 'traditional' submissive wife.
The spirit of a Russian revolutionary remains 
inside her. In fact, David says to her, "You 
think you are still an orator of the 1905 
revolution" (p. 427). Eva remembers the sound of 
her own voice, and she is able to rediscover it 
when she is dying, while Mrs. Grimes never has a 
voice to begin with. Eva is determined to pick up 
the beat of her own life and never again be forced 
to move to the rhythm of others" (p. 420). Mrs. 
Grimes' entire life, on the other hand, is 
dictated by the hunger of both men and animals.
The town butcher, who tries to be friendly to her, 
belittles even this occupation with his words, "if 
either the husband or son were going to get any of 
the liver Che had given her]...he’d see them 
starve first" (p. 43).
Another significant difference between the 
two women is that while Eva becomes shrunken and 
light as her illness progresses, Mrs. Grimes’ body 
"in death...looked like the body of some charming
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young girl" (p. 46). One reason -for this is that 
Eva, like her granddaughter "let [her]self feel 
things" (p. 444). Mrs. Grimes, in contrast, has 
stopped feeling: "she had got past being shocked
early in life" (p. 44). This last statement also 
reveals that something inside her, perhaps her 
sense of identity, had died when she was a girl 
and that her death in the woods was only the 
physical manifestation of an imaginative death 
which had occured long before.
In her journey through the woods the only 
thing Mrs. Grimes encounters besides death is the 
harshness and barrenness of the landscape, 
symbolizing that of her own life. In addition, 
even the narrator, in concluding this story, does 
not understand what her life meant. Anderson sees 
Mrs. Grimes merely as a "woman...destined to feed 
animal life" (p. 48) rather than a human being 
forced into numbness by ignorance and brutality.
In contrast, Eva, through her journey across the 
country and eventual reunion with Jeannie, loses 
her "reconciled peace" but reaffirms the richness 
of her life by retracing her entire past. We meet 
her in old age and, like David, go "past the 
mother treading at the sewing machine, singing 
with the children; past the girl in her wrinkled 
prison dress...lifting to him her 
awkward...imploring eyes of love" (p. 445) and 
return, finally, to the place that made her a 
revolutionary and the time "when she first heard 
music, a little girl on the road of the village 
where she was born" (p. 446). Eva, the night 
before her death, "dauntlessly...began a song of 
their youth belief" (p. 443) and repeats the words 
she has lived to fulfill, "And every life shall be 
a song" (p. 443). With those words Eva reveals 
how far she has gone beyond Mrs. Grimes, who dies 
"softly and quietly" (p. 45) and whose real name 
we never know.
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AN ANALYSIS OF YEATS' "A PRAYER FOR MY DAUGHTER"
Martha Michael
Yeats' lifelong struggle with conflicting 
desires for involvement and detachment, especially 
in relation to the Irish Nationalist Movement, 
which, according to Ellmann, made "each poem a 
battleground," is evident in what he fears and 
wishes for his child in "A Prayer for My 
Daughter." Unlike "Easter 1916," where the poet 
recognizes both the destructive and transformative 
powers of revolution, in "A Prayer for My 
Daughter," Yeats focuses only on the negative 
effects of conflict and longs to protect his 
daughter from all involvement with the raging 
storm which is the world. He envisions a choice 
between all that Venus had, the laurel and Horn of 
Plenty, and what she chose over them, the heat and 
violence of Vulcan.
The gloom which the poet experiences in the 
opening stanzas of the poem encompasses more than 
the worries of an anxious father, for Yeats 
imagines in Anne's future the realization of his 
apocalyptic vision in a "Second Coming," a 
disintegrating world in which the blood-dimmed 
tide, born of the murderous innocence of the sea, 
threatens the barely protected tower and the half- 
hidden child. This is Yeats' vision of the 
Ireland in which his daughter would grow up. The 
murderous zeal of Irish Nationalists, born of 
their innocence, was not to be controlled by the 
calculation characteristic of revolutionaries 
whose motives were less pure. In order that she 
might live in this world without suffering a fate 
similar to that of Helen of Troy and Maud Gonne, 
other victims of conflict, Yeats offers his 
daughter elements of the woman's Horn of Plenty: 
Beauty, Courtesy, Simplicity and Domesticity, and 
prays that she will not exchange them, as Venus 
and Maud Gonne do in the course of the poem, for
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the bellows and fire of Vulcan, the crippling and 
disfiguring violence belonging to the forger of 
weapons for the gods.
Venus, Yeats notes, having sprung, like the 
storm, from the sea, had no father to govern her, 
and so chose poorly in choosing Vulcan. Maud 
Gonne repeats Venus’ mistake when she opts to 
"Barter that horn and every good/By quiet natures 
understood/For an old bellows full of angry wind" 
(11. 62-65). As an attentive father, Yeats will 
not allow his daughter to make what he sees as a 
foolish choice. He wishes her instead the 
simplicity of a life marked by courtesy and an 
existence uncomplicated by the intellectual 
opinions which he hopes she will find "accursed." 
Yeats fails to see, however, that, in thus 
avoiding intellectual conflict, his daughter will 
be neglecting the "monuments of unageing 
intellect" by which, as an artificer, she might 
gain immortality. Intell ectualism is not the only 
quality which Yeats views askance, for he knows 
that if his daughter is excessively beautiful, she 
will be judged on and loved for her appearance 
alone. Without such beauty, however, Anne might 
lack the opportunity, which Leda had, to put on 
divine knowledge or power, even though at the same 
time, she will be spared the suffering which 
results from Leda’s divine communion— Helen.
Throughout the poem, Yeats attempts to offer 
Anne the protection which cradle-hood and coverlid 
do not provide by wishing a retreat for her from 
the tumultuous world of his day. He prays that 
her bridegroom, as his replacement, will remove 
her to a life of simple domesticity, marked by 
custom and ceremony, not revolution. Yet in this 
pleasant, placid life, where Anne, firmly rooted 
like a green laurel, and singing like a linnet, 
will quarrel and chase only in merriment, she will 
be immersed in the sensory world whose temporality 
Yeats sought to escape by sailing to Byzantium. 
Denied the qualities of an artist or of one who
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communes with the divine, Anne is denied all hope 
of immortality as well. In seeking to preserve 
her innocence by protecting her from the frenzy of 
the -future, Yeats seems to have retained the naive 
escapism of "The Lake Isle of Innisfree," without 
the accompanying consideration of the necessity of 
involvement with the problems and concerns of the 
world. He precludes for Anne any possibility of a 
transformation, of a share in the terrible beauty 
of MacDonagh, McBride, Connolly and Pearse.
"A Prayer for My Daughter," perhaps, is not 
only an expression of protective paternalism on 
the part of Yeats but a nostalgic lament for his 
country, whose innocence, he felt, was corrupted 
by conflict. But Yeats fails to see that each 
time he attempts to protect Anne from a 
destructive force, he denies her the experience of 
that force's transformative power, a power which 
he recognizes in other works as elevating his 
countrymen. Ironically Yeats' fears, which 
sentence his daughter to a banal existence are as 
potentially harmful as the revolutionary zeal of 
the Irish Nationalists, although they, like the 
heroic fervor of revolutionaries, are born of an 
"excess of love."
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SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR'S THEORY OF CHOICE AS SEEN IN 
MARGARET ATWOOD'S SURFACING
Maureen McGreevey
I shall place woman in a world of 
values and give her behavior a 
dimension of liberty. I believe
that she has the power to choose 
between the assertion of her 
transcendence and her alienation as 
object; she is not the plaything of 
contradictory drives; she devises 
solutions of diverse ranking in the 
ethical scale. Replacing value with 
authority, choice with drive; 
psychoanalysis offers a substitute, 
for morality— the concept of 
normality.
Simone De Beauvoir 
The Second Sex
This above all, to refuse to be a 
victim. Unless I can do that I can 
do nothing. I have to recant, give 
up the old belief that I am 
powerless and because of it nothing 
I can do will ever hurt anyone. A 
lie which was always more disastrous 
than the truth would have been. The 
word games, the winning and losing 
games are finished; at the moment 
there are no others but they will 
have to be invented, withdrawing is 





Choices the act of selections to pick the 
best or most preferable; to pick out, by 
preference, what is available. Such is the 
dictionary’s broad definition of an ambiguous 
word. Simone De Beauvoir, however, works out 
another, more specific, definition of choice. Her 
feminist perspective enables her to present an 
almost systematic approach to defining woman's 
ability to choose in a "man's world." Atwood's 
narrator in Surfacing is a concrete illustration 
of De Beauvoir's theory. This narrator, for 
example, experiences much of the oppression, 
struggle and bad faith De Beauvoir sees in women's 
path to authenticity, but ultimately, the narrator 
is able to transcend the bonds of oppression and 
enter the realm of active subject rather than of 
passive object.
De Beauvoir's definition of choice rests on 
two basic concepts: authentic and inauthentic 
decision making. Essentially, an authentic choice 
is made when a woman acts on her own needs.
(Note that De Beauvoir uses this theory when 
speaking about men also. However, for the sake of 
focus, I will refer specifically to women.) In 
other words, when a woman makes her own decision 
without conforming to or compromising with social 
or familial expectations, she has made a decision 
of and for herself. This decision, whatever it 
may be, is an exercise in freedom. To act in such 
freedom is to explore the boundary free expanse of 
individuality.
De Beauvoir, however, also recognizes women's 
ability to make many inauthentic choices. 
Specifically, women may acquiesce to any number of 
predetermined social roles (i.e. wife, mother, 
nurturer, counselor). In so doing, a woman may 
either be hiding from herself and her desires or 
she may be reacting passively. That is, she may 
be taking cover from an unfamiliar existence or 
she may be sensing futility and meaninglessness 
and reacting passively. According to Robert
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Cottrell, De Beauvoir feels "that an awareness of 
human liberty creates a sense of anxiety in the 
subject and leads him to search for himself in 
things. This search is a kind of flight from 
self."1 Either reaction renders choice 
inauthentic, thus inhibiting a woman’s individual 
freedom.
A woman’s freedom to choose, therefore, may perpetually be hampered. De Beauvoir once said 
that "women are not born but made."2 That is, 
women have been seeing themselves through male 
eyes for so long that they now accept themselves 
as second class. Because everything that surrounds 
women is patriarchal (literature, music, science, 
law, politics), women have come to accept 
themselves through the eyes of men as "the other" 
or, as De Beauvoir prefers to call it, as The 
Second Sex. Robert Cottrell further explains:
Although women are not the 
only others, the fact remains 
that women are invariably 
defined as Others. For women, 
it is of course men who 
constitute the Others.
...Women have accepted the 
male point of view and have 
conceived of themselves as 
unessential. They have by and 
large consented to be either 
an object or, to the extent 
that they incarnate certain of 
man's dreams, an image. In
either case they exist for men 
and not for themselves.3
Overall, De Beauvoir leaves women with only two 
essential choices: she can be "authentic" and 
make choices for herself or she can be 
"inauthentic" and let choices happen to her.
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At this point Da Beauvoir makes an important 
distinction; a woman who acts and chooses in life 
is being—for-itself where a woman who is passive 
and uninvolved in her own existence is being-in- 
itself. Cottrell •further clarifies this point:
Passivity is the being of 
things, whereas choice is that 
of human beings. In Sartre's 
famous terminology, often used 
by De Beauvoir, the former 
category of being is called 
being-in-itself, the latter, 
being-for-itself. To the
extent that human beings 
refuse to assume their freedom 
and falsify their existence by 
accepting pre-existing roles 
that relieve them of the often 
painful necessity of choice, 
they live in the mode of 
"being-in-itself" rather than 
"being-for-itself." That is 
to say, they live a life that 
is not authentically
human,...their lives are 
characterized by "immanence" 
rather than "transcendence. "4
Obviously, avoiding passivity is not easy, 
for it is frequently complicated and painful to 
choose. In order to understand De Beauvoir's 
conception of woman as passive object, it is 
important to understand De Beauvolir's concept of 
situation. Jean Leighton describes this theory 
concisely. "To become feminine is the equivalent 
of defeat. In becoming a woman the young girl 
somehow becomes a lesser human being. If one 
accepts being "the other", one must inexorably 
renounce one's real selfhood and exist as an 
inessential, derivative, lesser human being. Here 
again woman's 'situation' has pernicious 
effects."5 Women, in other words, experience many
62
inhibitions; in striving for authentic choice. De 
Beauvoir pays particular attention to physical 
(specifically menstruation) and historical 
inhibitions, but rather than dwelling on the 
oppressive nature of these conditions, De Beauvoir 
celebrates the dignity of the individual woman and 
the historical decision making she has 
accomplished. Carol Ascher clarifies this point 
in her biography Simone De Beauvoir - A Life of 
Freedom:
The Second Sex represents an 
enormous breakthrough in 
describing women’s oppression 
within the framework of 
choice. Put most simply, 
women have been oppressed 
throughout history, not that 
this oppression has meant they 
have been without freedom to 
choose. Rather, women have 
made choices within the limits 
set for the as well as, at 
times, beyond the confines of 
these limits, thus pushing out 




The great emphasis in De Beauvoir is 
"way out" of inauthentic choices. There 
several concrete routes to authenticity,  
is, De Beauvoir’s definition of choice, her theory 
of choice, her theory of situation and her strong 
belief in women’s ability to transcend that lead 
women away from inauthenticity. De Beauvoir’s 
definition of choice, for example, paves the way 
for an authentic existence. She feels that a 
woman can only reach her fullest human potential 
when she has transcended her inauthenticity and 
made choices in her situation. Because not 
choosing is actually making a choice, choices are 
inevitable. Therefore active, authentic decisions 
are the key to an existence made in "good faith." 
De Beauvoir acknowledges that there are many
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things that may potentially inhibit choices 
outside an individual’s situation <i.e. other 
people, economic inequities, etc.). However, De 
Beauvoir calls women to work within their 
circumstances in order to reach the highest 
pinnacle of humanity: "Whatever the
circumstances, we have a freedom of action that 
enables us to surmount them." 7
Finally, De Beauvoir has an unwavering faith 
in women’s ability to transcend her situation via 
a "project." A project is a vigorous, all 
encompassing act. Cottrell has again summed up 
the theory of transcendence embodied in the notion 
of "project":
...man is free and that to 
live authentically he must 
assume his freedom by 
performing a vigorous act 
which, in the vocabulary of 
existentialism, is usually 
called a "project." When 
Beauvoir writes that man is 
transcendence, she simply 
means that by a continuous 
series of "projects" man 
repeatedly reaffirms his 
autonomy and fashions his own 
life. Furthermore, what one 
transcends, is always one’s 
past and cannot be built 
without it. In Beauvoir’s 
scheme of things, the future 
is usually built by reacting 
against the past. Her notion 
of "project" generally 
contains a sense of refusal or 
rejecti on.8
The narrator in Margaret Atwood’s Surfacing 
explores De Beauvoir’s concept of choice. She has 
been passive (that is, she has not assumed the
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role of actor in her life), and, in addition, she 
has made inauthentic decisions which, as we later 
learn, have contributed to her insanity. When her 
being begins to struggle against this condition 
she begins to recognize the social and familial 
expectations which have shaped her. Ultimately, 
she recognizes her inauthenticity in being acted 
upon and goes insane. Only as a result of a 
"rebirth," a plunging into the depths of her 
consciousness, is she able to choose and act 
authenticall y.
The narrator's detachment and passivity 
impressed me as soon as I began the novel. She is 
a woman who could look at her lover and her father 
with a striking, calculating indifference. At one 
point her striking passivity and marked 
indifference causes David to remark, "I realize 
that you walk around in never-never land... .
She is introduced as a loner who has returned in 
quest of a father she doesn't want to see. In 
other words, she is a character who begins 
isolated and gradually grows more and more 
isolated from her friends and her society. 
Consequently, however, she also isolates herself 
more and more from the inhibitions they place on 
her (i.e. their desire to have her entertain them, 
David’s desire to sleep with her, her resistance 
to the call for "constant togetherness"). 
Ultimately, she reaches a pinnacle of being-for—  
itself or being for the sake of being.
The narrator’s most poignant moment of 
passivity and self-denial occurs when she watches 
David and Joe film Anna without her bathing suits
I wanted to run down to the 
dock and stop them, fighting 
was wrong, we weren’t allowed 
to, if we did both sides got 
punished in a real war. So we 
battled in secret, undeclared, 
and after a while I no longer
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•fought back because I never 
won. The only defense was 
flight, invisibility.10
Certainly Atwood’s narrator is talking about the 
oppression of women in this passage, but she 
senses the futility of fighting against a male 
oriented existence. Ultimately, she is explaining 
why she has chosen the world of passivity rather 
than the world of authenticity.
At this point, we see how social, work, and 
familial relationships have led this woman to 
question her authenticity. Having ventured on 
many of what De Beauvoir would label projects, the 
narrator has been slowly working towards being- 
for-itself. Her canoe trip to search for her 
father, her trip blueberry picking, and her 
ultimate trip to dive for the picture which would 
give her a new "vision," lead her away from her 
past towards the life of an active, choosing 
individual. Her refusal to marry Joe, her desire 
to continue her father’s quest, and her gradual 
independence from her group of friends are only a 
few examples of how a new woman works out of being 
"object" towards being self.
The narrator’s quest for authenticity 
culminates in the diving scene. Here she is in 
quest of "true vision; at the end, after the 
failure of logic." Having reached the "saturation 
point," she dives into the lake which ultimately 
symbolizes a dive into her own consciousness. She 
adopts the sheltered, weightless feeling of an 
unborn fetus floating peacefully and undisturbed:
Pale green, then darkness,
1ayer after 1ayer, deeper than 
before, seabottom; the water 
seemed to have thickened, in 
it pinprick lights flicked and 
darted, red and blue, yellow
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and while, and I saw they were 
fish, the chasm-dwellers, tins 
lined with phosphorescent 
sparks, teeth neon. It was 
wonderful that I was down so 
far, I watched fish, they swam 
like patterns on closed eyes, 
my legs and arms were 
weightless, free-floating; I 
almost forgot to look for the 
cliff and the shape.11
As a result, she recognizes the ugliness of 
inauthenticity. She remarks: "I killed it. It 
wasn’t a child but it could have been one, I 
didn’t allow it."12 She continues to recognize 
what inauthentic choice has done to her when she 
realizes that "I should have seen that was no 
different, it was hiding in me as if in a burrow 
and instead of granting it sanctuary I let them 
catch it. I could have said No but I didn’t; that 
made me one of them too, a killer."13 (Underlining 
mine.) Here, her most inauthentic act (her 
abortion), the memory of which is triggered by the 
dive, causes her to lose her sanity. Essentially, 
she loses the self constructed in bad faith and 
reconstructs a self made in good faith.
This final project triggers her quest for the 
essential, bare self. She turns on all the 
potentially oppressive forces she had known 
(family, friends, clothing, and shelter) and loses 
all the social expectations and dictates. Reborn 
into a primitive, societyless state, she claims,
"[I] no longer have a name. I tried for all those 
years to be civilized but I’m not and I’m through 
pretending. ...From any rational point of view I 
am absurd; but there are no longer any rational 
points of view. "14 Obviously she possesses the 
power to act and to shape her own existence, and 
ultimately, this new power allows her to dump the 
film with all its lies and ugliness. She tears 
down her past. A new person surfacing with the
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ability to choose and the ability to create, she 
can now put the past behind her and search for the 
choices open to her. Having transcended her 
circumstances, she can key on herself, the 
individual, as the way back to a social world.
She is no longer an object; rather, she is an 
individual with complete freedom:
David and Anna were here, they 
slept in the far bedroom; I 
remember them, but
indistinctly and with
nostalgia, as I remember 
people I once knew. They live 
in a city now, in a different 
time. I can remember him, 
fake husband, more clearly 
though, and now I feel nothing 
for him but sorrow;...but I 
was not prepared for the 
average, its needless
cruelties and lies. My
brother saw the danger early.
To immerse oneself, join in 
the war, or to be destroyed, 
though there ought to be other 
choi ces. 15
It would seem that Atwood did a thorough 
reading of De Beauvoir prior to writing Surfacinq, 
for the concepts of struggle, oppression and 
authentic choice are inextricably mixed in both 
authors’ works. Both De Beauvoir and Atwood 
accept the same definition of choice and both 
advocate the great liberating power choice can 
have. Most importantly, both writers see that 
woman can transcend the bonds of inauthentic, 
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"THE CHASE" TO WILDNESS
Joanne M. Cassetti
If you could be an animal, any animal, what 
would you be? I think the first time I was asked 
that question was in second grade. I thought it 
was slightly bizarre at the time but later began 
to understand the possible significance of it. 
Rumor had it that the answer to this question 
could be the key to one's entire character. I 
wondered and so I answered immediately that I 
would be a Lynx. I had thought about a cat 
because cats are graceful, instinctual and sly. 
But, they are also awfully small. Then I saw a 
television commercial for a car that pictured a 
Lynx as part of the advertisement (or that’s what 
my mother called it). And I decided to be 
portrayed as a beautiful, big, strong, powerful 
cat who could outrun other animals in the Jungle 
and who knew how to survive. The point of this 
story is that it never entered my mind to be a 
bird-a small, preyed upon, fragile and often caged 
animal. Yet, it entered the mind of Alberto 
Moravia and is used very effectively in "The 
Chase," where Moravia employs the metaphor of a 
bird to change perceptions of power and freedom 
and therefore to change perceptions of male and 
female.
"Everything is wild which is autonomous and 
unpredictable and does not depend upon us," 
explains the narrator.1 This is true for animal 
life because wildness is acceptable in their 
world. But for human life, wildness is forbidden, 
especially to women. It is the human male, the 
hunter and the eager who enters the animal world 
and acts accordingly. "My father was leading the 
way...he stooped down, picked up something.... 
There was a bird in the palm of my hand, its 
dangling, shattered head crowned with a plume of 
already-thickening blood" (p.318). The hunter
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seeks to capture and destroy those species that he
can overpower--not -for survival but -for sport.
Moravia compares this hunt to the hunt that is 
carried on in our society. The male hunts the 
•female and the female responds. But, instead of 
letting the two enjoy being "wild''— that is, 
autonomous and unpredictab1e (they) become ’tame’" 
(p.319). Or, rather, society teaches the female 
to repress her wildness and become like the 
hen— "an automaton in the form of a bird; 
automatic are the brief rapid steps with which it 
moves about; automatic its hard, terse pecking..." 
(p. 319) .
This being the social order of things, it is 
easy for a man to became a hunter and a woman a 
hen. Moravia’s narrator, however, rejects this 
division. As a child, he will not be taught the 
conventions of manhood that exist in our society. 
He looks at the bird not as a hunter, but as an 
observer: "It was like watching an animal whose
vitality was rendered more intense by the very 
fact of my watching it" (p.318). As a child, he 
is not threatened by tears: "I burst into tears 
and dropped the corpse on the ground" (p.318).
As a man, however, he is almost trapped in 
the conventions of our society. He stops watching 
his wife as he watched the bird. Marriage (a 
social institution) has tamed her and has, 
therefore, prompted him to lose interest. Gone is 
that "air of charming unpredictability, of 
independence in her way of living" (p.319). Gone 
is his innocent ability to smell or therefore 
sense "the acrid quality of a wild beast’s lair" 
(p.319). When that wildness that so attracted him 
to his wife is reawakened, it occurs outside 
social convention in the awfully sinful and 
exciting realm of an affair. Moravia becomes the 
child again. He has the opportunity again to hunt 
and cage and conquer. But he does not. He 
understands "that his unknown man who took such 
liberties with [his] wife was also attracted by
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wildness" (p.321). He knows that intervention 
would amount to nothing "but the shot [his] father 
fired at that free, unknowing bird as it perched 
on the bough" (p.322). He "had to remember that 
wildness, always and everywhere, is directed 
against everything and everybody" (p.322).
The analogies that Moravia makes between 
hunters and birds and men and women are only the 
bases upon which he makes a much more devastating 
statement about life. By understanding the 
wildness of a bird and similiarly the wildness of 
his wife, the narrator changes the meaning of 
freedom from patriarchal strength and physical 
power to wildness. In so doing, the bird becomes 
as powerful an image as the Lynx or the bear or 
any other animal because all are wild and all are 
autonomous.
The narrator, therefore, in rejecting the 
structural order that forces us to lose our 
wildness rejects the conventional image of 
manhood. But his redefinition of manhood and of 
human life is a frightening one: "I had to 
remember that wildness always and everywhere, is 
directed against everything and everybody"
(p.322). One might rephrase that and say that 
everything happens with "No Immediate Cause," the 
point being that nature is not perfectly moral nor 
divine either. It is this unpredictability that 
is part of our beauty. By structuring our 
wildness, by imposing a system, we insure our 
safety. Our nature can no longer be directed 
against us, but we ruin our own beauty.
Moravia's characters step out of their 
cultural cages and neither of them acts morally.
It is easy to find fault with the wife because in 
social terms she is an adulteress. But why find 
fault with the husband? Because, in terms of our 
society, he is not a man. He doesn’t intervene; 
he doesn’t fight: he doesn’t hunt and destroy. He 
is not a man because he is more of a man. He
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comes to terms, if you will, with his own wants 
and needs and begins to see the woman that he 
married. "I felt at that moment her vitality 
reached its diapason, just as happens with wild 
animals" (p.321). The narrator never condemns her 
and he never condemns himself. He only 
understands the wildness that is part of every one 
of us.
It is important to note that "The Chase" is 
written from a male perspective and that the 
character from whose perspective it is written is 
nameless. The voice of this man is, I believe, 
potential in most men. It expresses the 
understanding that they lack. Withe t this 
understanding, they hunt and seize and cage. They 
also question, but the questions are forgotten and 
the hurts are pushed away because they are men. 
They must be men. Similiarly, other nameless 
wives escape from their coops to meet nameless 
boys who remind them of the days when wildness was 
permitted.
The situation is a sad one, but it has arisen 
because of our own fear, the fear that some day 
our nature may be directed against us and that we 
will have no structure capable of restraining it.
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